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"[I]f regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act or 1996 Act) was signed
into law by President William J. Clinton on February 8, 1996. In addition
to being the largest comprehensive rewrite of federal telecommunications
law in decades, its framers argue that the Act promises to increase the op-
tions available to consumers and to open up previously monopolized or
oligopolized markets to all telecommunications carriers in this, the age of
fiber optics. The President stated that the 1996 Act "fulfills [his] Admini-
stration's promise to reform our telecommunications laws." 3 He also noted
that the Act "seeks to remove unnecessary regulation 4 and "opens up
competition between local telephone companies, long distance providers,
and cable companies."5
While on its face this appears to be a noble objective, many local
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) Regulatory versus per
se takings will be discussed infra Part IV.B.
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)).
3. Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 652, 32 WEEKLY COMP.
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governments6 complain that their management responsibilities are being
usurped as they lose control over who can occupy their property and how
much they can charge for the use of their rights-of-way. More importantly,
the 1996 Act so appropriates the rights of local governments to exclude
others, that at least one of its provisions, section 253, ' violates the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.! Thus, municipalities
should be justly compensated for that which has been, or will be, taken
from them pursuant to section 253.
Using an analogy familiar to law students, when the government is
found to have taken one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property--such as the right to exclude
others-there is immediately a compensable taking. Municipalities are
experiencing such a seizure under section 253, Removal of Barriers to En-
try, which provides in relevant part:
(a) IN GENERAL.-No State or local statute or regulation, or other State
or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibit-
ing the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate tele-
communications service.
(b) STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY.---Nothing in this section shall af-
fect the ability of a State to impose, on a competitively neutral basis
and consistent with section 254 of this section, requirements necessary
to preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and
welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services,
and safeguard the rights of consumers.
(c) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ATHoRITY.-Nothing in this
section affects the authority of a State or local government to manage
the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable compensa-
tion from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral
and nondiscriminatory basis, for the use of public rights-of-way on a
nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation required is publicly dis-
closed by such government.
(d) PREEMPTION.--If, after the notice and an opportunity for public
comment, the Commission determines that a State or local government
has permitted or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement
that violates subsection (a) or (b), the Commission shall preempt the
enforcement of such statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the
6. This Note uses the terms "local forms of government" or "local governments" as
including all state, county, and city governments. As the most profoundly affected of these
groups will be cities or municipalities, these forms will be used most often.
7. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 253, 47 U.S.C.A. § 253 (West
Supp. 1997).
8. The Fifth Amendment reads: "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
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extent necessary to correct such violation or inconsistency.10
Section 253 prohibits local governments from denying competitive
telecommunications carriers the right to use their rights-of-way. While the
language of section 253(c) purports to give municipalities the ability to
continue to manage their rights-of-way, cities are only allowed to dis-
criminate between competitive carriers in a manner that is "competitively
neutral."" As a result, serious questions are raised as to the true ability of
municipalities to manage their right-of-way infrastructure. Further, the Act
only allows cities to exact from telecommunications providers "fair and
reasonable compensation," not the "just compensation" mandated by the
Constitution. Section 253 was written to appear reasonable on its face.
However, the ramifications of the competitive neutrality and antidiscrimi-
nation mandates, and of the "fair compensation" fee ceiling is daunting for
cities. Municipal management will be thwarted if telecommunications car-
riers choose to litigate the matter of cities charging fair rental value,
granting permits and franchises, and protecting their citizens from unsafe
or financially unsound enterprises.
In retaliation, and in an attempt to preserve their management sover-
eignty, municipalities are in the process of fighting to win back their ap-
propriated rights.'2 While Congress has purported to give municipalities a
safe harbor with section 253(c), this Note will demonstrate the toothless-
ness of that "protective" clause, and show that section 253 as a whole pro-
hibits cities from managing their rights-of-way. Congress's drafting failure
amounts to a taking of private property for public use, and cities must be
justly compensated. This compensation could be paid either by the federal
10. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a)-(d).
11. Id. § 253(c).
12. See e.g., GST Tucson Lightwave, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 950 F. Supp. 968 (D.
Ariz. 1996); TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
1997 WL 580831 (1997) [hereinafter TCI Memorandum Opinion and Order]; Classic Tel.,
Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 13,082, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1062
(1996) [hereinafter Classic Memorandum Opinion and Order].
For an interesting and in-depth view of the arguments of individual cities and tele-
communications concerns, see TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc., Petition for De-
claratory Ruling of PROTEC (petition date Sept. 4, 1996); Implementation of Section 302
of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Petition for Reconsideration of the National League of Cit-
ies (petition date July 5, 1996); Reply Comments of the National League of Cities, to the
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CS Dkt. 96-46 (Apr. 11, 1996);
Comments of the National League of Cities, to the Report and Order and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking in CS Dkt. 96-46 (Apr. 1, 1996).
While some of these motions deal with section 302 of the 1996 Act, concerning
Open Video Systems (one of the options available to a local exchange carrier wishing to
provide video programming to subscribers), the relevant property interest and takings issues
argued are similar in form and substance to those raised concerning section 253.
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government or by the firms that are the beneficiaries of the appropriation.
Telecommunications attorney Nicholas P. Miller contends that re-
gardless of the impressive asset value on telecommunications firms' bal-
ance sheets, the most valuable property used by them is obtained at almost
no cost at all: the public rights-of-way. Furthermore, Miller asserted in
1994:
There is little awareness that .... [T]he telephone and cable television
industries are pushing the White House and Congress to a quick and
fundamental preemption of local governments' property rights. Con-
gress is moving now to deprive local government of current real estate
rights that will be worth hundreds of billions of dollars .... Congress
is proposing to transfer these rights essentially cost-free to private in-
vestors seeking to use the public rights-of-way for wireline telecom-
munications networks.'
4
It appears that Miller's predictions came true with startling accuracy in the
promulgation of section 253. Since local government is the citizenry's
trustee for the rights-of-way, 5 Miller contends that municipalities have an
absolute obligation to use those rights-of-way to best benefit the commu-
nity. The ultimate goal, of course, would be to retain basic property rights,
such as the right to exclude others and the revenue-generating opportuni-
ties that accompany those rights. The implication for municipalities is that
they must do all they can to retain control of their property and the area
above, beneath, and around it, by receiving just compensation for the use
of their rights-of-way.)
Part II of this Note examines the historical and current interaction
and conflict between the federal and local governments and telecommuni-
cations providers. It also examines more closely the provisions of section
253. Finally, Part II describes the first three cases involving section 253
and discusses how they might affect municipalities in the years to come.
Part III lists the direct and indirect harms to municipalities inherent in sec-
tion 253 and highlights how they outweigh the benefits of this piece of
legislation, particularly from the standpoint of future investment. Part IV
discusses what a taking is under the Fifth Amendment, and explains how
13. Nicholas P. Miller, Local Government: The Silent Investor in Wireline Telecommu-
nications Networks, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT ROLES AND CHOICES ON THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY: TENANTS OR ARCHITECTS OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS FuruRE? 20
(1994).
14. Id. at21.
15. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984) (finding that the term
"private property" in the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause encompasses the property of
state and local governments, and the same principles of just compensation apply to those
claims as they do to those of individual citizens).
16. Miller, supra note 13, at 22.
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section 253 violates well-settled takings jurisprudence. Part V compares
the concept of "fair" compensation found in section 253(c) with the "just"
compensation mandated by the Fifth Amendment. It ends with a discussion
of rudimentary valuation methods municipalities should consider when
placing a just compensation dollar amount on their rights-of-way.
II. INTERACTION AND CONFLICT BETWEEN LOCAL AND
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CONCERNS
A. From Cooperation to Conflict
Early in this century, local governments encouraged entrepreneurs to
build a telephone network, and later a broadcasting infrastructure, that
could provide for the communications needs of their constituents. In the
hope of encouraging investment, agreements between cities and the small
number of service providers in existence were drafted requiring few, if
any, rental fees or conditions.17 In the following years, these local tele-
phone providers had "automatic franchises" and did not pay cities more
than a nominal fee for the privilege of physically occupying and cutting
into the rights-of-way. With the advent of cable television franchises in the
1960s, municipalities began to realize the value and revenue opportunities
inherent in franchising. Thus, they charged fees and awarded franchises on
.... 18
a competitive-bid basis.
As bid amounts, fees, and competition increased throughout the
1970s and 1980s, cable and other telecommunications industries ap-
proached Congress, which since has been limiting the conditions imposed
and the fees municipalities can charge for right-of-way franchises.19 Thus,
cable television and long-distance companies usually were, and still are,
the only providers to pay anything more than nominal fees to counties and
cities for right-of-way access; local telephone, satellite, and cellular pro-
viders typically did not, and do not, pay. Further, it appears that few pro-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. This Note will not discuss extensively the franchise issues that emerged with the
promulgation of the 1996 Act other than for a brief discussion of the TCI Cablevision of
Oakland County, Inc. case and fees, infra Parts II.C.2. and II.D., and will not address the
differences between franchised telecommunications providers and those which simply pay
access fees to local governments.
20. Miller, supra note 13, at 21. The latter two services are wireless and use towers and
relay stations. Some of the unique properties of wireless transmissions media raise issues
that place them beyond the scope of this analysis. For simplicity, only wireline media and
cable or wire existing above, below, or around a local government's rights-of-way will be
explicitly discussed in this Note. However, the concepts formulated here are applicable,
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viders, if any, pay the "fair market" or rental value for use of the rights-of-
way. Indeed, industry coalitions agree that fees were initially set low to
encourage young, utility-based industries.2' The current fair market value
should include a healthy return to municipalities, and must be at least
enough to cover direct costs; the risks to the populace of excess digging;
and the psychological and societal costs of additional construction, road
repair congestion, and disruption of and damage to the facilities of other
service providers.
Section 253 forces local governments to allow all telecommunica-
tions firms to use their rights-of-way with a self-regulating frequency. In
the interest of increased competition, private investment, and flexible gov-
ernment regulations, 2 Congress has enjoined municipalities from disal-
lowing any telecommunications firm from taking the precious raw material
that they need to exist: space. Any management activities that the 1996 Act
allows cities to continue are only to be exercised on a competitively neu-
tral, nondiscriminatory basis. 3 Instead of allowing monopoly and antitrust
matters to be addressed by statutes that are already in place (such as the
Clayton and Sherman Acts), Congress has given away cities' property in
the absence of any stated municipal wrongdoing. This prevents city man-
agers from exercising their honed ability to judge which firms are best to
provide particular services and thus, which should be allowed to perma-
nently occupy their most valuable asset.24
Congress should have assumed, in the absence of conspicuous or re-
with modification, to wireless services and to some of their aspects, including physical in-
stallations on municipality property not located in rights-of-way, which will be briefly dis-
cussed infra Part IV.B.
21. See, e.g., Pole Owners Call Cable Mature; Cable Calls Pole Owners Anticompeti-
tive, COMM. DALY, July 1, 1997, at 2.
22. See President Clinton's Statement, supra note 3.
23. The "management activities" allowed by and within the scope of section 253 ap-
pear quite limited. The Act explicitly states that cities no longer have the right to prohibit
any entity from providing telecommunications service. This mandate would include pro-
hibiting a firm from entering the area beneath its streets. According to the first opinions to
be docketed in this matter, "Congress envisioned that in the ordinary case, States and lo-
calities would enforce the public interest goals delineated in section 253(b) through means
other than absolute prohibitions on entry .... " Classic Memorandum Opinion and Order,
11 FCC Rcd. 13,082, para. 38, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1062 (1996).
Congress attempted to list some of the permissible right-of-way management finc-
tions that cities would still be allowed to perform after section 253 was enacted. The most
permissive include: (1) regulating the time or location of excavation to preserve effective
traffic flow or hazardous road conditions; (2) requiring a company to place its facilities un-
derground, rather than on poles above the streets; (3) enforcing local zoning regulations;
and (4) requiring a company to indemnify the city against any claims of injury arising from
a company's excavation. See 141 CONG. REC. S8172 (daily ed. June 12, 1995).
24. See generally 141 CONG. REC. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
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peated municipal impropriety, that most cities' management decisions are
rational. City officials are elected by a populace which carefully scruti-
nizes how local leaders determine the balance between new service pro-
viders and the direct and indirect costs to that entry. Clearly, the national
legislature is not comfortable entrusting the next era of telecommunica-
tions expansion to our local leaders. While our system of government is
based upon the federalist notion that state and local governments are closer
to the nation's citizens, Congress believes that local leaders' actions will
not accurately reflect the needs and desires of both their constituents and
global telecommunications networks. Local officials are elected (in part
because of their rational evaluative process through city council meetings
and public hearings) to issue permits and franchises so that city residents
and customers benefit in terms of price, variety of services offered, and
public safety concerns. If Congress would allow these managers to con-
tinue making the best decisions for America's citizens, city residents could
hold their local elected officials accountable for telecommunications issues
rather than unelected remote Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) bureaucrats. The ramifications of this legislation will af-
fect local governments in a way that a responsible Congress surely could
not have envisioned.
B. The Four Provisions of Section 253
The 1996 Act is a congressional attempt to address the increasing
concentration and Balkanization of cable and telecommunications mar-
kets.2' Section 253(a) is Congress's main check on local governments get-
ting in the way of its plans for a superior American telecommunications
infrastructure. The prohibition on local governments' interference with
even the slightest competitive action under section 253(a) gives the FCC or
the courts the power to nullify local rules. These rules-which have or
may have the effect of hindering competition, no matter how slightly -
25. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1 (1996).
26. Although the FCC indicated in the Classic Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11
FCC Rcd. 13,082, paras. 40-42, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1062, that it does not have authority
to rule on disputes in which section 253(c) (the "safe harbor" provision) is triggered, it is
unclear how other tribunals will rule. As will be seen infra Part II.C.3., the Ninth Circuit
has found that section 253(c) is not an offense for telecommunications firms, but is rather a
defense for cities. Regardless of which entity has jurisdiction, section 253(a) still prohibits
state and local governments from preventing any entity from providing service. Absent a
Supreme Court decision, this Note assumes that as the statute expressly states, the FCC has
the power to enforce section 253 in its entirety. Even if section 253(c) were under the juris-
diction of the federal courts, this Note asserts that they would ultimately find a taking pur-
suant to the Supreme Court's decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
[Vol. 50
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are the one mechanism by which local governments have been able to ex-
ercise management control over their rights-of-way.
Proponents of the legislation counter the cities' arguments against
section 253(a) by rallying around section 253(b) which states: 'Nothing
shall affect the ability of a state to impose on a competitively neutral basis
requirements necessary to... protect the public safety and welfare, ensure
the continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the
rights of consumers,"" and section 253(c), 29 which states: "Nothing in this
section affects the authority of a state or local government to manage the
public rights-of-way.., on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory
basis .... ,.0 Lawmakers insist that these two provisions will continue to
allow city officials to maintain their rights-of-way as they traditionally
have. However, the "competitively neutral" and "nondiscriminatory" terms
found in these two subsections revoke any power that proponents of sec-
tion 253 were trying to leave to municipalities. While the legislative his-
tory of the Act shows that a few members of Congress tried to address
maintaining a balance between local autonomy over right-of-way man-
agement and increased competition, section 253(c) fails to reserve an ac-
ceptable level of management authority to cities. The local governments'
inability to distinguish between telecommunications carriers on their own
terms renders them powerless against preemption petitions filed by
scorned service providers when they are asked to pay fair rental value
(e.g., more than the simple cost of repaving the streets when they are fin-
ished laying cable).
This preemption power is found in section 253(d), in which the FCC
is given the power to consider any preemption request on a case-by-case
32basis. Thus, whenever a local government enacts a statute which either is
adverse to a telecommunications concern or denies a franchise to one of
them, the provider may be able to file a preemption request with the FCC.
This will ultimately void any safe harbor hoped for by city-friendly Con-
gressional members. In fact, Michele C. Farquhar, Chief of the FCC's
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB), has noted that as of De-
cember 5, 1996, less than one year after passage of the Act, the FCC al-
458 U.S. 419 (1982), which is discussed in detail infra Part IV.
27. Telecommunications Act of 1996, see. 101(a), § 253(b), 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(b)(West Supp. 1997).
28. Id.
29. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(c).
30. Id.
31. See 141 CONG. REc. S8172 (daily ed. June 12, 1995).
32. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(d).
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ready had ten petitions for preemption pending under section 253. 33 Con-
cerning section 704 (which preserves the authority of state and local gov-
ernments over the placement, construction, and modification of personal
wireless facilities-land use issues that traditionally have rested with the
states), Farquhar stated that local governments will find that cooperating
with communications providers will help cities realize greater revenues
and enhanced service sooner.34 However, she failed to mention any in-
stances of pre-section 253 local governments not cooperating or availing
themselves of the benefits of increased telecommunications competition.
Notably, Congress and telecommunications commentators have also failed
to mention any evidence of a local government that did not operate in the
best interest of either its constituents or the global telecommunications in-
frastructure before the promulgation of the 1996 Act.
C. Section 253 Jurisprudence: The First Three Decisions
1. Classic Telephone, Inc.
Several important controversies have reached the FCC or the courts
in the wake of section 253."5 The first of these, Classic Telephone, Inc.,
was brought against two small Kansas cities-Hill City (population 1798),
and Bogue (population 191)-which denied requests for franchises from
Classic Telephone, Inc. 3' Bogue had previously permitted a competing
telecommunications service provider, Rural Telephone Service Company
(Rural), to enter into the market and serve the customers residing there.
Similarly, Hill City (population 1989) opted to turn to Rural because the
firm had recently invested between 5.5 to 6 million dollars in fiber optic
cable installation and had guaranteed one-party phone lines and Internet
access for all customers. Further, Rural had over forty years of providing
telecommunications services in the area.38 The cities in part based their de-
nial on the fact that Classic planned to buy out United, a small telecommu-
nications provider with an antiquated system (so antiquated, in fact, that it
still provided four-party lines to one-half of its subscribers).39 Incidentally,
33. Farquhar Discusses Tower Siting, Universal Service and Other Bureau Priorities
at FCBA Luncheon, Dec. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 699830.
34. Id.
35. Classic Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 13,082, 4 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 1062 (1996).
36. Id.
37. Frank Shafroth, FCC Sets Precedent for Local Authority Under Telecom Law,
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"Hill City had terminated United's franchise in 1993 'on the ground that it
was dissatisfied with the quality of United's local telephone service.
' '40
Hill City has asserted that it has "no desire or intention to limit qualified or
trustworthy entities from providing telecommunications services,"4 but
that it should be permitted "to deny the request of an unqualified company
for a franchise to operate a telephone system and business."42
The cities alleged that Classic's franchise application was denied on
consumer protection grounds, which is within the clear purview of the mu-
nicipal management powers contained in section 253(b) and (c).43 Hill City
and Bogue also stated to the FCC that they did not grant a franchising
permit to Classic because they wanted to: (1) protect their citizens from a
harmful service provider; (2) preclude unqualified and untrustworthy enti-
ties from providing inadequate services; and (3) eliminate from competi-
tion a firm which was unable to exist over the long run due to poor finan-
cial performance. 4 In fact, the cities explicitly stated that: (1) Rural was a
local company with a good reputation for telecommunications services
whereas Classic was headquartered in Texas and had no established repu-
tation for furnishing telephone services; (2) Rural's subscribers were its
owners while Classic's owners were unknown; and (3) Rural had shown
that it had the financial resources with which to build an advanced tele-
communications network, whereas Classic had only claimed that it was fi-
nancially secure without revealing its financial statements.45
These appear to be concrete criteria that can be applied to all firms in
a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory manner, putting municipal
managers within the section 253(c) safe harbor. 46 Not surprisingly, in its
Memorandum Opinion and Order, the FCC said these reasons were not
enough, finding that they were a "prohibition on entry" prohibited by sec-
tion 253(a).47 Strangely, later in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, the
FCC stated that characteristics such as a firm's: (1) record as a cable op-
40. FCC Makes Use of 'Preemption' Authority, Overturns Kansas Franchise Rejec-
tions, TELCO COMPETrION REP., Oct. 10, 1996.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Classic Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 13,082, para. 29,4 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1062 (1996).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. In fact, the cities, cognizant of Kansas and federal law prohibiting the grant of ex-
clusive franchises, argued that they were not excluding all firms except Rural, but were
simply denying the franchise of an applicant (Classic) that was not qualified to provide tele-
communications services. The FCC denied that argument, stating only that it found that
Classic was qualified. Id. para. 19.
47. Id. para. 26.
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erator; (2) promises to upgrade existing systems; and (3) marketing prac-
tices; "are all actions the Cities may legitimately regulate"8 by requiring
all otherwise qualified entities to have them, as long as the cities abide byS 49
the same "competitively neutral" requirements. Perhaps if the munici-
palities had written down the criteria that they had used in granting a fran-
chise to Rural, or if they had told Classic what its criteria were for fran-
chise approval (and if those criteria were approved by a governmental
body designated to determine their legitimacy), they would have been
permitted to use them without being in violation of section 253.
The cities' criteria appear to be of a type that can be applied to all
firms in a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory manner. However,
the FCC's Memorandum Opinion and Order declared that the cities' deci-
sions were preempted. In its first decision on the balancing of federal pre-
emption and local authority, the FCC stated that Hill City and Bogue had
expressly violated section 253, and the cities were given sixty days to
"expeditiously reconsider" Classic's franchise requests. 0 Of course, this
decision simply directs the cities to grant Classic a franchise. While Con-
gress may believe that the FCC is qualified to second-guess the cities'
judgment and franchise-granting processes, the litigious situations in
which this new policy threatens to put municipalities will be costly and
time-consuming.
Anticipating these arguments, the Classic Memorandum Opinion and
Order stated: "[Contrary to [the cities'] arguments, the plain language of
section 253 does not exempt from the scope of federal preemption purely
local matters of franchising authority."'" This patently states that the FCC
has authority to preempt and overturn very local decisions, even though
the FCC decision makers are not elected by the residents of municipalities.
Thus, only the FCC is to determine whether a local government has made a
wise decision by disallowing a telecommunications firm from occupying
the space beneath its rights-of-way. Paradoxically, the Classic opinion then
stated that denying a franchise is a perfectly legitimate action for a city to
take and certainly within the scope of the powers reserved in section
253(b).5 2 Unfortunately, the FCC seems to believe that a city is only com-
plying with the 1996 Act when it grants franchises to all telecommunica-
tions companies, as it later reminds the cities that Congress expressly al-
lows such a preemption of their authority (and a rejection of federalism),
48. Id. para. 33 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id. para. 50.
51. Id. para. 23.
52. Id. para. 28.
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deeming it "consistent with the overriding goals of the Act." 3 These para-
doxical statements combined are at best contradictory, and at worst a fla-
grant disregard for the autonomy of cities.
In addition, the Classic Memorandum Opinion and Order states that
section 253(a) was "intended to remove not only statutory and regulatory
impediments to competition, but economic and operational impediments as
well." 5 4 Certainly, those four types of obstructions cover almost any possi-
ble municipal regulation: what municipal actions-aside from determining
festival days or parade routes-are not statutory, regulatory, economic, or
operational? The Classic decision implies that the "perfectly legitimate
action" of denying a franchise is exactly the kind of activity that Congress
wanted to thwart in an effort to aid lobbying firms trying to maintain their
foothold or initially get into the telecommunications industry. However,
while this determination should end the argument in favor of the FCC, it is
clear that such a reading of the statute will render municipalities powerless
in their management functions.
Turning to the meaning of "competitive neutrality," the FCC stated in
the Classic Memorandum Opinion and Order: "At the very least, this
mandate of competitive neutrality requires the Cities to treat similarly situ-
ated entities in the same manner." However, this "definition" does not go
far in clearing up confusion. It is easy to see how AT&T and Ameritech
are "similarly situated," but how are an Internet service provider or a local
cable concern and AT&T or Ameritech at all similar, except in that they
provide telecommunications services and require access to rights-of-way?
It is difficult to imagine that Congress (even a Republican one) could place
a fledgling firm and a Fortune 50 company on similar financial footing.
Municipalities cannot effectively function if they are not allowed to objec-
tively differentiate between all of the groups that want to use their most
valuable resource. City managers must retain the ability to exercise their
discretion in holding differently sized companies to appropriate standards
and to reject access to their rights-of-way if those companies do not meet
certain objective requirements. These elected officials are better able to
determine what their constituents want, how their franchises and permits
should be granted, and how otherwise to use their streets.
Classic demonstrates the immense burden the competitive neutrality
mandate will place on cities. A municipality must meticulously document
every factor that figured into its decision and ensure that all companies are
judged by the exact same standards--even though the differences between
53. Id. para. 25
54. Id.
55. Id. para. 37.
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the large conglomerates and the small, upstart companies are remarkable.
City managers must then hope that every limit and condition they set that
is brought before the FCC will be approved.
Finally, concerning section 253(d), the Classic Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order stated that pursuant to its authority under section 257 of the
Act,56 the FCC had been chosen by Congress to identify and eliminate
market entry barriers. 7 It stated that this authority complimented its even
broader reach under section 253 to "preempt legal requirements that 'may
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting' the provision of telecommunica-
tions services."" Hill City and Bogue each argued that their refusal to al-
low Classic to serve their communities was not necessarily a prohibition
on entry, but was rather the denial of a franchise to a company who was
ill-equipped and objectively unqualified to provide service. Despite evi-
dence to that effect, the FCC refused to believe the cities' arguments,
choosing instead to find that they were trying to maintain a lucrative mo-
nopoly situation in two cities with a combined population of less than 2000
people. 9
The Classic decision appears, at least on the facts provided, to be in-
ternally paradoxical. There is absolutely no evidence that the cities were
judging Classic or other potential market entrants by different standards
than they had judged Rural, or that they had judged Rural using a more le-
nient level of scrutiny." Further, the FCC acknowledged in the Classic
Memorandum Opinion and Order that sections 253(b) and (c) "recognize
the authority of States and localities.., to impose entry requirements for• s,61
certain purposes...." However, the decision reiterates the fact that mu-
nicipalities are essentially powerless in deciding the form and substance of
such "purposes." The 1995 Congressional House and Senate debates give
little doubt that the allowable instances in which municipal managers can
impose regulations on telecommunications carriers are few and a largely
impotent sort.62
Finally, it is interesting to note that Rural received its franchise per-
mit on March 7, 1994; over two years before the Act mandated that cities
56. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 257, 47 U.S.C.A. § 257 (West
Supp. 1997).
57. Classic Memorandum Opinion and Order, I 1 FCC Rcd. 13,082, para. 15, 4 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1062.
58. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a)).
59. Id. para. 42.
60. Id. para. 7.
61. Id. para. 28 (emphasis added).
62. See generally 141 CONG. REc. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995); 141 CONG. REC.
S8172 (daily ed. June 12, 1995).
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behave with perfect competitive neutrality toward a new influx of cable,
phone, and other telecommunications providers. Further, Classic applied
for the franchise petition in May 1995, over a year before "competitive
neutrality" was to be the standard in franchising selection processes. How
could the cities have been expected to be on notice, thirteen months before
the Act was promulgated, that they should meticulously screen franchising
applicants-no matter their size, reputation, or financial information--to
prepare for potential federal administrative proceedings two years in the
future? It is clear that Classic only marks the beginning of the loss of mu-
nicipal control over rights-of- way.63
2. TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc.
The TCI Cablevision decision" dealt with an ordinance written by the
City Council of Troy, Michigan, which generally required companies pro-
viding telephone service to obtain a local franchise. TCI Cable sought
permission from the City of Troy to upgrade its cable system. However,
the company wanted to route fiber through a business park that was not
served by cable television.65 Due to the rapid convergence of different tele-
communications industries and the cross-capabilities afforded to all firms
with fiber optics and other wireline and wireless advances, Troy officials
decided that because TCI was installing telecommunications facilities, it
needed a telecommunications franchise-unless it could justify its cable-
specific need to route through the business park. Because TCI could not
explain the need for the detour, Troy assumed that the firm was trying to
get around the city's access controls on ducts and conduits and avoid pay-
ing reasonable compensation for its use of Troy's property.66 TCI con-
tended that under the 1996 Act, "municipal franchising of telephone com-
panies is eliminated, [and] that it can provide telephone service under its
cable franchise. 67 Thus, the company believed that it need not pay a tele-
63. As of March 7, 1997, Hill City and Bogue have ignored the FCC's request that they
"expeditiously" reconsider Classic's franchise application. John Seiver, an attorney repre-
senting Classic, stated: "Ignoring the FCC's order is the same as rejecting the franchise. We
want an injunction. We want sanctions. This is ridiculous. It's like dealing with a disobedi-
ent child. The FCC has got to put its foot down." Joe Estrella, Cable-Telco Seeks Sanctions
on Towns, MULTICHANNEL NEws, Dec. 16, 1996, at 16. Classic is asking the FCC to impose
financial sanctions of $250,000. Id.; see also Classic Still Wants Franchises but Won't Buy
Kansas Exchanges, STATE & LocAL COMM. REP., Mar. 7, 1997.
64. TClMemorandum Opinion and Order, 1997 WL 580831 (1997).
65. TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling of
PROTEC (petition date Sept. 4, 1996).
66. Ted Hearn, FCC in Deadlock on Troy Dispute, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar. 3 1,
1997, at 56.
67. Barrie Tabin, Municipal Leaders Defend Local Authority Before FCC, NATION'S
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phone franchise fee based on a percentage of its telephone revenues, and
should have been able to begin providing telephone service while paying
no additional fees at all.68
An FCC hearing was called in the wake of this predicament, with
69TCI urging the FCC to void Troy's ordinance. The National League of
Cities, on behalf of Troy and in response to MCI's petition, filed a reply
urging the FCC to find that the City of Troy had the power, pursuant to
sections 253(b) and (c), to adopt an ordinance requiring service providers
to obtain licenses or franchises for each segment of the telecommunica-
tions arena in which they operate. Moreover, the petition argued that the
TCI petition ignored the Stupak-Barton amendment to the Act (basically,
section 253(c)), which appears to prevent the FCC from ruling on matters
relating to ights-of-way and compensation."
In a surprising turn of events in March 1997, then FCC Chairman
Reed Hundt appeared ready to back Troy's petition, which would have
given cities the ability to regulate cable operators as new telecommunica-
72tions providers. In fact, a senior FCC source at the time said that the
agency has clear authority to preempt the Troy ordinance whether or not
TCI sought a franchise.73 While TCI argued that the ordinance was a bar-
rier to entry and in violation of section 253(a), the cities averred that the
ordinance simply fell within section 253(b) and (c) allowances for local
governments to manage themselves while adhering to the nondiscrimina-
tion and competitive neutrality mandates.
By July 1997, the FCC had still not issued a decision in TCI Cablevi-
sion, perhaps primarily because its value as a test case was weakened by
TCI's acknowledgment that it did not actually plan to begin telecommuni-
cations service in Troy after all.74 The FCC Local and State Government
Advisory Committee expressed concern about cases like TCI Cablevision,
stating that the 1996 Act "designates state and local governments as the
primary entities" for right-of-way issues, and "regulation, preemption, and
formal legal action against another level of government should be the last,
CITIES WKLY., Dec. 23, 1996, at 1, 19 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling of
PROTEC, (petition date Sept. 4, 1996).
71. Id.; Heam, supra note 66, at 1; see generally 141 CONG. REC. S8172 (daily ed. June
12, 1995).
72. Hearn, supra note 66, at 1.
73. Id.
74. FCC Still Wrestling with Basic Concepts of Preemption of Local Rules, COMM.
DAILY, July 2, 1997, at 2.
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not the first, recourse to resolving conflicting interests. 75
On September 19, 1997, the FCC issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order in TCI Cablevision,76 which discussed section 621, the franchising
provisions of the 1996 Act, and summarily mentioned section 253. Limit-
ing this situation to its facts, the FCC determined that the City of Troy in-
terfered with TCI's operation of its cable system in a manner that violated
the limitations placed on cities' franchising powers.77 Specifically, the FCC
found that the City violated the 1996 Act's franchising provisions by
placing a telecommunications condition on its grant of cable permits.
However, the Commission found that TCI lacked standing to bring suit
pursuant to section 253 because it has no present intention of offering tele-
communications services in the city. Further, the FCC declined to issue a
declaratory or advisory ruling as to whether Troy's telecommunications
ordinance should be preempted, in whole or in part, under section 253(d).78
However, the FCC did state that it was "concerned that Troy may be
creating an unnecessary third tier of telecommunications regulation that
extends far beyond the statutorily protected municipal interests in manag-
ing the public rights-of-way and protecting public safety and welfare. 79
The FCC's concern was not misplaced, as the City of Troy seemed intent
on creating an extra echelon of regulation which "aspires to govern the re-
lationships among telecommunications providers, or the rates, terms and
conditions under which telecommunication service is offered to the pub-
lic."8 In addition, the FCC found "especially troubling" the discriminatory
application of telecommunications regulation practiced in the City of Troy,
including granting the incumbent providers "most favored nation" status8'
and inexplicably failing to respond to permit applications within a reason-
able time.82
While these municipal activities are indeed egregious, a single city's
improper actions cannot be imputed to all municipalities, particularly as
there is no indication that this is anything more than an isolated case. One
municipality's abuse of its local franchising and management powers is
not reason enough to abridge the property rights of all of our nation's cit-
75. Id. at 1.
76. TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1997
WL 580831 (1997).
77. Id. para. 5.
78. Id. para. 7.
79. Id. para. 8.
80. Id. para. 105.
81. Id.
82. Id. para. 76. One of TCI's permit applications was not addressed by the City for 10
months.
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ies. Unfortunately, the FCC did not address the substance of section 253's
reserved municipal management powers; instead it admonished one par-
ticular city for its admittedly intolerable actions. While the Commission
warned cities not to take their management duties too far, it did not specify
limits, nor did it place a dollar value on the amount that local governments
can properly charge for their rights-of-way. As a result, it remains impos-
sible to discern what course of action the FCC or the courts will take re-
garding the ability of municipalities to obtain the fair rental value for the
use of their property.
3. GST Tucson Lightwave
Another recent case, GST Tucson Lightwave v. City of Tucson, does
not involve the FCC at all. Plaintiff GST Tucson Lightwave brought suit
against the City of Tucson because it did not require US West to pay a 5.5
percent franchise fee required of other telecommunications providers. The
United States District Court for the District of Arizona did not reach the
merits, however, and granted the city's motion for judgment on the plead-
ings. The court found that Congress did not intend for section 253(c) to be
an enforcement provision for telecommunications providers, but rather it
was intended to be a defense for municipalities against claims that they
had erected barriers to entry." Reiterating the fact that Congress had
deemed section 253(c) a safe harbor, the court found "that the regulation of
public rights-of-way must be done on a competitively neutral and nondis-
criminatory basis is a condition of the defense, not an element of a viola-
tion."85 Recalling the Stupak-Barton amendment, the court noted that con-
gressional intent was to allow states and municipalities to retain control
over local rights-of-way. Further, the court cited dicta from Classic de-
claring that section 253(c) was intended to benefit state and local govern-
ments as a defense mechanism.86
Moreover, the court found that section 253(d) allows the FCC to pre-
empt enforcement of state and local regulations which violate section
253(a) or (b), but not subsection (c), noting that section 253(d) makes no
mention of subsection (c). In addition, the court found that exclusion under
subsection (c), although deliberately omitted in order to give fair compen-
sation for the use of municipal property, was not intended to provide for
private enforcement of section 253(c) by telecommunications providers.
Rather, the exclusion simply prevented FCC preemption for a municipal
83. GST Tucson Lightwave, 950 F. Supp. 968 (D. Ariz. 1996).
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violation. Thus, the court held that a carrier cannot sue a state or local gov-
ernment for charging "discriminatory" licensing or franchise fees because
there exists no private right of action pursuant to section 253(c)." Of
course, GST Tucson Lightwave plans to take the decision to the Ninth Cir-
cuit according to its Vice-President of Legal and Regulatory Affairs, Jef-
frey Mayhook." However, the court, by injecting some common sense into
section 253's enforcement, has at least temporarily made subsection (c) a
true safe harbor, which classifies the decision as a minor, but important
victory for municipalities."
D. The Matter of Fees
Under section 253, municipalities may be forced to change their fee
structures for franchises, licenses, and the like to comply with the "fair and
reasonable compensation" standard forwarded in section 253(c). Currently,
there is no statistical database comparing fees across local governments,
and the figures that are disclosed usually have no common denominator.
There is certainly no universal revenue percentage or flat fee structure in
place, and each state, county, and municipality has its own method of de-
termining compensation from telecommunications concerns. Larger tele-
communications firms frequently find these differences confusing because
the number of local governments employing different fee structures are as
varied as the physical, economic, and societal costs of utilizing the rights-
of-way. However, for municipalities to retain autonomy and managerial
control over their most precious resource, it is imperative that they are al-
lowed to implement flexible and differentiated fee-rate structures, perhaps
on a firm-by-firm basis.
Some members of Congress, calling singular percentage of gross
revenue structures anticompetitive, have been vehemently opposed to their
assessment.9' The rationale behind this notion seems to be that small tele-
communications "upstarts" cannot afford to relinquish their earnings to
87. Id.
88. Court Says GST Can't Sue Tucson over Entry Barriers, TELECOMM. REP., Jan. 13,
1997, at 16.
89. See Barrie Tabin, Local Authority Gets a Boost from Federal Court Decision,
NATION's CTms WKLY., Jan. 27, 1997, at 1.
90. See 141 CONG. REC. H8461 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (comments of Rep. Fields)
("[That fee [I 1% of gross revenues] becomes a cost of doing business for that provider,
and, if you will, the cost of a ticket to enter the market. That is anti-competitive.") Con-
gressman Fields did not expound upon why he believes that telecommunications concerns
should not have to incur such costs, while almost all other providers of goods and services
must pay entry costs (including those for research and development, plant, property and
equipment, advertising, raw materials, and other inventory) simply to enter an industry and
be operational.
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pay cities for the use of city property. Fees currently range from zero to
about eleven percent of gross annual revenue, with the average being
around four to five percent.1 Recent examples of these fees include those
of the City of Tucson, which charges most licensees/franchisees 5.5 per-
cent of gross annual revenue from customers served within the city's lim-
its.12 Further, the City of Denver reports that although it spends 500 million
dollars annually to maintain its rights-of-way, it receives only 38 million
dollars from telecommunications and cable providers in compensation. 93
Moreover, it estimates that its rights-of-way have a fair rental value of 483
million dollars.94 However, Denver city officials are probably well aware
that after the passage of the 1996 Act, talk of fee hikes may induce tele-
communications providers to file preemptions with the FCC, placing city
managers out of the "fair and reasonable compensation" range of section
253(c).
According to news reports, most local governments in the Orange
and Seminole Counties of Florida have ordinances assessing upon tele-
communications companies a one percent annual franchise fee. Lake
County raised the fee to five percent in 1994; the telephone companies re-
fused to pay, and still have not paid.95 In general, figures provided by Con-
gressman Stupak indicate that municipalities alone spend 100 billion dol-
lars per year on rights-of-way management, while they only receive about
three percent of that figure from all firms combined, including remittances
from gas, electric, private water, telephone, and cable companies.96
The only similarity between these different cities is that the fees are
low when one considers the myriad direct and indirect costs that cities in-
cur as a direct result of street cuts and utility damage.97 However, a trend
has recently developed among local governments to charge additional fees
that will allow them to cover their costs and realize the "true value" of the
91. Id. (Comment of Rep. Fields); Rene Stutzman, Counties Don't Dig Phone Line
Upheaval, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 12, 1996, at 9.
92. GST Tucson Lightwave v. City of Tucson, 950 F. Supp. at 969 (1996). US West
paid no license or franchise fee to the city and GST Tucson Lightwave, a newcomer, was
subjected to the fee. Id. In that case, the district court did not arrive at the merits because it
found that, under section 253(c), GST Tucson Lightwave had no private cause of action
against the municipality for managing its rights-of-way as it saw fit. Id. at 971 n.4.
93. Anthony Crowell, Local Government and the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
PUB. MANAGEMENT, June 1996, at 7. The article did not discuss how city managers arrived
at the above-mentioned figure.
94. Id.
95. Stutzman, supra note 91, at 9.
96. 141 CONG. REC. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
97. For a discussion of the harms caused by street cuts, see infra Part III.
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area beneath their rights-of-way.98 Unfortunately, with the 1996 Act, that
effort is being thwarted by a legislature determined to undermine the
power of cities to properly manage their rights-of-way and by a network of
lobbyists determined to procure low-cost access to that property.99
A Florida city proposed an ordinance to charge annual fees on con-
struction permits for wireless facilities and modifications to such struc-
tures.'O The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau immediately concluded
that the ordinance would be in violation of section 253 if it had the effect
of prohibiting entry of a provider or of regulating either the entry of a pro-
vider or the placement, construction, or modification of wireless facilities.
The Bureau found this to be an example of a fee that was separate from a
tax. The FCC is also reviewing this due to a petition before it asking for
preemption of a property tax assessed by the State of Oregon based partly
on the license fee a PCS provider paid the FCC.'
Neither the FCC nor Congress has explained why it would not also be
discriminatory for cities to charge firms a flat fee. If a flat fee were to be
charged, it could not be very large. Logically, only a veteran firm like
AT&T would be able to absorb a high amount without difficulty and a
smaller upstart firm would be financially handicapped by it. While this
would be a neutral, objective way of asking for fees, doing so might pres-
ent a "barrier to entry" for the smaller firm. Therefore, a city has no choice
but to consistently charge that which the "lowest common denominator"
firm can feasibly pay. As usual, the real loser here is the local government,
which is told only that it is allowed to manage its rights-of-way by charg-
ing "fair compensation." However, the competitive neutrality mandate in
section 253 dictates that whatever dollar amount is attached to the term
"fair compensation," it cannot be so high that cities financially endanger a
firm and run the risk of forcing it out of business. This would certainly be
seen as an "anti-competitive" tactic by the FCC.
Therefore, as municipalities are left to decide how much to charge as
fair compensation, many questions remain unanswered. For instance, Con-
gress cannot expect that each municipality-from Hill City to New York
City-has the ability or manpower to scrutinize the financial statements of
each telecommunications firm who desires to provide service, in order to
determine exactly how much each could pay while maintaining a competi-
98. Bryan Gruley, Disputed Call: Detroit Suburb Sparks Fight by Levying Fees on
Telecom Concerns, WALL ST. J.-EuROPE, Dec. 24, 1996, at 1.
99. Miller, supra note 13.
100. WTB Responds to CTIA "s Request for Rule Clarification on State, LocalAuthority,
MOBILE PHONE NEWS, Jan. 20, 1997.
101. Id.
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tively neutral stance as compared to other firms. These record-keeping
tasks will leave municipal managers little time for any other management
functions, one of the many harms promulgated by section 253.
III. How SECTION 253 WILL HARM MUNICIPALITIES
A. Direct and Indirect Harms
Section 253 must be modified by Congress, if not to avoid a taking,
then to allow cities to avoid some of the serious problems that have al-
ready surfaced in the telecommunications companies' rush to exploit sec-
tion 253 and similar provisions of the 1996 Act. The influx of telecommu-
nications firms increasing the amount and frequency of digging beneath a
city's streets creates expense and inconvenience on a scale that is just now
being realized. According to Frank Shafroth, Director of Policy and Fed-
eral Relations for the National League of Cities, the quality of the streets
and sidewalks, the cost to repair them, and the potential loss of revenue
will indeed be problems for cities and taxpayers.'02 Additionally, munici-
palities increasingly report damaged grass and landscaping, sinkholes cre-
ated by the shoddy workmanship of inexperienced company repair crews,
and broken water mains and gas lines (the latter of which has potentially
lethal effects)."3 It is therefore not surprising that municipal managers are
frustrated by the effects of section 253 and are concerned for their cities'
futures. Comments such as those from Troy, Michigan, City Attorney Pe-
ter Letzman are not uncommon: "Mr. Reed Hundt, you come out here and
fix one of these broken water mains and fight your way through all this ca-
ble and see what the little communities face!"'
4
The harms that some municipalities have already experienced are so-
bering. For instance, in a study commissioned by the City of San Fran-
cisco,'O researchers found that the pavement aging process is significantly
accelerated by increased levels of utility cuts. Three to nine utility cuts
cause a thirty percent reduction in service life compared to streets with less
than three cuts. Streets with more than nine cuts have a fifty percent-plus
reduction in service life.' °6 Furthermore, arterial streets (where the majority
of digs occur) exhibited the most severe reduction in service life and right-
102. Patricia Horn, Phone Hangups: Cities Find Themselves Blindsided by Effects of
Deregulation, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 13, 1996, at 1G.
103. Gruley, supra note 98.
104. Id.
105. GHASSAN TARAKI, CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, THE EFFECT OF UTILITY CUTS ON THE
SERVICE LIFE OF PAVEMENTS IN SAN FRANCISCO: STUDY PROCEDURES AND FINDINGS (San
Francisco State University 1995).
106. Id. at 6.
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of-way safety. The direct and indirect costs of these cuts will increase ex-
ponentially as companies begin fully exploiting the permissiveness of sec-
tion 253.
With each additional entrant into the rights-of-way, municipalities
will face increased road replacement and other costs. In addition, their
constituents will also face increased travel time, loss of access and trade to
local businesses, increased noise pollution, and visual intrusion---not to
mention accidents from improper installation or repair (particularly by in-
experienced workers with newer companies).' 7 A catalog of true and re-
cent occurrences tells the tale:
" In Denver, two houses were leveled and another ten damaged in
an explosion caused when a construction crew cut an eleven-inch
hole in a natural gas line while installing a cable television con-
duit;
* In San Francisco, where there had been over a dozen similar ex-
plosions in the preceding twelve months, a company ruptured a
steam pipe underneath a downtown office building. If the explo-
sion had occurred while the building had been occupied, hun-
dreds of people would have been scalded;
* In Batavia, NY, telephone service for the entire city (presumably
including 911 emergency service) was cut for over twenty-four
hours when an inexperienced phone crew severed the main tele-
phone cable serving the city.'
Cities are especially concerned with the problems of potential accidents
and accompanying liability they will face when they want to access a util-
ity line blocked by the many wires laid by telecommunications provid-
109
ers.
One of the most distressing harms for cities to endure will be the loss
of control over their rights-of-way. Under section 253, no factor-neither
firm size nor probability of continued service nor market share-will be
able to stop a telecommunications company from digging beneath a right-
of-way and commingling its cable with gas mains and other installed lines.
The only recourse for a municipality is to instigate a suit (or become the
defendant in such a proceeding) before the FCC or in court. Congress has
given no indication that the financial viability of a firm,'10 the reputation of
107. NATIONAL ASS'N OF TELECOMM. OFFICERS AND ADVISORS, LocAL RIGHTS-OF-WAY
MANAGEMENT: COORDINATION ESSENTIALS AND COST ANALYSES 1 (1995).
108. Id. at 5.
109. Tabin, supra note 67, at 19.
110. This number should include the certain direct and psychological costs associated
with accommodating a firm's need to cut open the rights-of-way, only to have the firm fail
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a firm, or community support or disdain for a firm, can be any major part
of a city's decision to prohibit a firm from occupying its ights-of-way.
This may lead to strange results. For example, even if a city treated every
firm equally with regard to an annual revenue requirement, there would
necessarily be "discrimination" between the larger, higher revenue firms
and smaller, break-even firms. Such a requirement would not only be im-
permissible under the competitive neutrality mandate of section 253(c), but
would also impede the access of some firms to the city's right-of-way in-
frastructure, violating section 253(a). Although proponents of the Act in-
sist that they have preserved the rights of states and municipalities to man-
age their ights-of-way through the "safe harbor" of section 253(c), the
poorly defined competitive neutrality provision will prove to be a difficult
challenge for cities.
In addition, cities are overwhelmed by new demands the Act has
dealt them.112 Describing section 253 and similar Act mandates as bringing
on conditions "like the Oklahoma land rush," Florida city officials receive
a barrage of new visitors each day, including MCI, Intermedia, BellSouth,
Ameritech, Sprint, and others, all demanding information on every public
road and right-of-way." 3 Cities have been forced to form alliances, hire
expensive telecommunications attorneys, and redraft major sections of
their municipal codes to regulate and set guidelines for the use of rights-of-
way. Other cities, too inundated with demands, have placed moratoria on
telecommunications construction until they can redraft their ordinances."
4
For instance, the City Council of Pico Rivera, California, has enacted a
yearlong moratorium on "the acceptance, process, or issuance of any per-
mit for siting antennas for wireless communications.""15 Further, according
to the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), nine
Minnesota cities have adopted moratoria on tower siting, thanks to a state
and close out its books in a year. Citizens are then forced to change carriers, and cities must
then either find buyers for the firm's cable or dig up the cable so its space can be used by
other telecommunications companies or utilities.
111. Section 253(c) allows municipal management of rights-of-way only if done on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 253(a), 47
U.S.C.A. § 253(c) (West Supp. 1997).
112. Horn, supra note 102 (describing the Act's effects on Florida cities as a "stealth
bomber: barely seen until it already passed").
113. Id. (quoting Chris Barton, a Fort Lauderdale City planner).
114. Id. Incidentally, the legality of this action is questionable under section 253 as it
prevents firms from laying cable, and thus, from obtaining access to rights-of-way. Is a city
acting with competitive neutrality if it bars new firms from laying cable while permitting
firms already there to continue operating? Perhaps to remedy this "discriminatory" situa-
tion, the congressional solution would be to turn off all phone service.
115. Groups Seek FCC Protection from State, Local Officials, TR WRELESS NEWS, Jan.
9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8252744.
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statute which permits cities to adopt ordinances prohibiting construction of116
new tower sites. The statute is designed to protect the planning process
and the health, safety, and welfare of Minnesota's citizens. The CTIA,
however, looks to the FCC to follow an aggressive implementation of the
competitive policies found in the 1996 Act, such as section 253, to quell
these delays.
As a result of these foreseeable and unforeseeable burdens and in-
conveniences, cities have recently begun levying higher fees, attempting to
approximate what they believe is the fair rental value for the area above,
beneath, and around their rights-of-way."8 Many no-nonsense city officials
are adamant about these new fee structures. According to Dearborn,
Michigan Mayor Michael Guido, President of the Michigan Municipal
League, "Cities have property. It's called rights of way. The public paid
for them. They should be compensated."" It is true that firms in the regu-
lated cable television and long-distance industries-particularly new
"upstarts"--stand to lose substantial revenues in fees to local governments.
On the other hand, telecommunications behemoths such as AT&T, Amer-
itech, and MCI, continue to be protected by no-fee or nominal-fee con-
tracts that have been in place for almost 100 years-usually drafted before
the cities themselves were incorporated. Undoubtedly, these telecommu-
nications firms funded (at least in part) congressional support for section
253, knowing that having free run of the rights-of-way will keep their low-
fee or no-fee contracts intact. It is difficult to imagine that this is the com-
petitive paradigm Congress had envisioned. However, while it is unfair to
smaller companies which have to pay fees while larger, existing monopo-
lies do not have to pay, it is less fair-and unconstitutional-to force cities
to give up their property rights to accommodate every firm that wants to
get into the telecommunications game. Warning of this situation three
years ago, Mr. Miller stated:
Local governments own valuable property that telecommunications
companies want to use for their own profit, and at no charge. Local
authorities must be free to balance the issues surrounding fair compen-
sation to the community for use of its public rights-of-way, and free to
116. Id.
117. Id. CTIA Executive Director Thomas Wheeler states, "[T]he smart lawyers for city
governments came up with moratoria as a sort of 'limbo' for citing applications, calling
them a "subterfuge" to "get around" the instructions of Congress. Id.
118. Horn, supra note 102.
119. Cable Firms, Towns Square Off in Suit over Public Lands: Officials in Two Detroit
Suburbs Say the Companies Are Misinterpreting the Rules, GRAND RAPms PRESs (Mich.),
Oct. 14, 1996, at B3.
120. Id. These "fees" are in addition to the base tax local forms of government are al-
lowed to assess on municipalities.
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set the terms, conditions, and value of that use.
While local governments traditionally have been allowed to decide what is
best for their constituents, it is clear that Congress has been lulled into an
absurd sense of fairness concerning local autonomy and right-of-way man-
agement.
B. The Future of Municipal and Private Investment
What if a federal agency or branch of government, instead of giving
to telecommunications companies something which ordinarily is not seen
or of which few are aware, took away recreational areas from state or local
governments without just compensation? The federal government could
argue, as it has with section 253 right-of-way provisions, that telecommu-
nications companies need the park space provided to them without inter-
ference from the property owner. These companies would need places to
erect towers and park their vehicles, and where better than on valuable
municipal ground? While this example seems outrageous, so should the
fact that section 253 effectively "donates" municipal property, held in trust
for tax-paying citizens, to telecommunications companies without just
compensation. Cities are not eleemosynary institutions; rather they operate
on strict budgets. As modem jurisprudential standards require just com-
pensation, fairness also mandates it.
On a practical level, according to Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman,
takings law should be predictable over time so that private actors can con-
fidently commit resources to capital projects.'2 One can infer from her
analysis that the formalization of takings law, as it has occurred in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,"' and which directly applies in
the case of section 253, is a correct result. If section 253 were changed so
as not to take municipal property, both municipal and industry investors
would be able to make more informed choices because the Court has pro-
vided clear standards to determine exactly when compensation will be
paid. 124 Section 253 will be a speculative mandate if allowed to stand, and
a dangerous precedent if its provisions are ever upheld in a court of law.
If cities are told that their most valuable resources can be given away
without their approval, investment in public works most certainly will di-
minish. This may lead to a general apathy about developing areas which
the government may have its eye on for development by other rapidly
121. Miller, supra note 13, at 24.
122. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1697, 1700 (1993).
123. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
124. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 122, at 1700.
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evolving industries. These costs of public policy are massive and harmful
to municipalities. Courts in many jurisdictions now allow public and mu-
nicipal fear of government regulation or other factors to be figured into the
fair market value of appropriated property.'2 As the value of property is
driven down by such elements, municipalities and their constituents will
suffer. Regardless of the economic and political arguments against section
253, and despite the public safety issues and the problems of excess pollu-
tion, noise, and road repair that will increase in municipalities (largely
without their permission), these are compensable where there is a consti-
tutionally impermissible taking. Part IV addresses the history of takings
law and the 1982 Loretto decision, in which the Supreme Court found that
permanent physical appropriations, such as those which occur under sec-
tion 253, must be justly compensated.
IV. SECTION 253 TAKES PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE
A. Section 253 Violates the Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment expressly mandates that if private property is
taken for a public use, it must be justly compensated.12 6 State governments
are accordingly prohibited from taking individual or municipal property127
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ap-
propriation of municipal property under section 253, which is held in trust
for the citizenry, clearly violates the Takings Clause. Government interfer-
ence with property rights, such as environmental or zoning regulations,
often triggers procedural and substantive due process issues. In these
situations, courts typically examine three factors: (1) the character of the
governmental activity; (2) the action's economic impact on an individual's
property rights; and (3) the extent to which that action interferes with
property owners' investment-backed expectations.' These cases require a
legitimate purpose that is rationally related to the goal of the regulation.
However, where there has been a permanent physical appropriation, such
as when municipalities' property has been "given" to telecommunications
carriers, a taking is immediately established.29 In such a situation, it is the
125. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1987)
(where the Florida Supreme Court citing Willsey v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 6 Kan.
App. 2d 594, 605-07 (1981) stated: "We join the majority of jurisdictions... and hold that
the impact of public fear on the market value of the property is admissible without inde-
pendent proof of the reasonableness of the fear.").
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
127. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
128. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
129. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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finder of fact who determines the just compensation due. The following
analysis will demonstrate that when applying Supreme Court case law, a
taking is clearly inherent in Congress's section 253 mandate.
B. What Is a Taking?
Two hundred years of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence has allowed
the modem Supreme Court to develop a bifurcated takings doctrine. 3 ° In
essence, the doctrine consists of a legitimacy test, which focuses on the
benefits to society of the governmental action, and an impact test, which
examines the harms to the landowner as part of the analysis. 'M The legiti-
macy test requires that the action substantially advance a legitimate gov-
ernment interest. An action fulfilling this requirement must also pass the
impact test, which adds the landowner's injury into the inquiry.
Further, the impact test is broken down into two subtests aimed at
discovering whether the governmental action is extreme enough to man-
date just compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.3 2 The first of
these determines whether the action is regulatory in nature or if it is a
physical invasion. Regulatory takings reduce either the monetary value of
the appropriated property or its historical value (i.e., how reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations are or will be affected by the action).' 33 As
the United States became urbanized and residents became concerned with
noxious land use and other nuisances involving governmental regulation,
courts upheld statutes regulating which activities could be performed on
certain parcels of land. 3 Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 3' has become a leading opinion sup-
porting the proposition of awarding monetary damages for regulatory tak-
ings. Justice Brennan stated that police power regulations can "destroy
the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just
130. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Loss Aversion and Involuntary Transfer of Title, in LAW
AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 331, 342 (Robin Paul Malloy &
Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (where the Supreme
Court held that a regulation barring coal mining under an inhabited area, even without
physical invasion of the property, could fit within the Fifth Amendment taking prohibition);
see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
134. See generally Stake, supra note 130, at 346.
135. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Margaret Teresa Harris & John Patrick Parker, Note, Compensable "Takings"--
and Why Not? An Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause and Police
Power Regulatory "Takings", 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 365, 383 (1986).
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as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property."' 37
Justice Brennan went on to state:
It is only logical, then, that government action other than acquisition of
title, occupancy, or physical invasion can be a "taking," and therefore
a defacto exercise of the power of eminent domain, where the effects
com.letely deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the prop-
erty.
Section 253 could be evaluated as a regulatory taking as Congress does not
expressly prevent local governments from making use of some part of their
property as part of a zoning regulation. However, because it is clear that
the instant legislation works a physical invasion, section 253 is more easily
evaluated as a per se physical appropriation.
Physical appropriations can be separated into temporary and perma-
nent takings. Temporary takings began with wartime seizures, 39 and arise
in situations where a legislative initiative requires property owners to part
with their property for a statutorily mandated period of time.14 Section 253
clearly does not fit within this category of takings as the 1996 Act does not
state when municipalities can resume their "normal" managerial functions.
There is nothing "temporary" about the nature of section 253. Its man-
dates, lacking explicit language to the contrary, are eternal in nature.
Therefore, section 253 is a permanent physical taking. The history of this
Supreme Court doctrine and the key cases that have marked its develop-
ment are discussed in the next section.
C. Permanent Takings Case History and Loretto as
the Key Precedent
Beginning with Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 4 ' in which the State of
Wisconsin built a dam which infringed upon the property rights of an indi-
vidual by permanently flooding his land, the Supreme Court ruled that
even though the government did not take title to Pumpelly's property, the
action still required that just compensation be paid to him. Following
that decision, the Supreme Court considered other situations dealing with
takings and local governments' rights-of-way. In one such case, St. Louis
137. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 652.
138. Id. at 653.
139. For an interesting treatment of this topic, see Dennis H. Long, Note, The Expanding
Importance of Temporary Physical Takings: Some Unresolved Issues and an Opportunity
for New Directions in Takings Law, 72 IND. L.J. 1185 (1997).
140. Most recently, these cases have involved initiatives such as the "Rails to Trails"
program. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For an
analysis of the cases dealing with this complex program, see Long, supra note 139.
141. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
142. Id. at 171.
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v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 43 the Court held that the City of St. Louis
could collect reasonable compensation for a telegraph company's use of
telegraph poles already located on the city's streets. The Court declared:
It matters not for what that exclusive appropriation is taken, whether
for steam railroads or street railroads, telegraphs or telephones, the
State may if it chooses, exact from the party or corporation given such
exclusive use pecuniary compensation to the general public for being
deprived of the common use of the portion thus appropriated.'4
While this opinion allows local forms of government to exact monetary
compensation directly from firms that use its ights-of-way, many of St.
Louis v. Western Union Telegraph's progeny have held that it also applies
to those cases where the government takes the property of an individual or
municipality. Thus, the fair market value of that which has been taken
from municipalities and given to communications firms should be calcu-
lated so cities can be compensated.
Modem courts have also relied on a 1904 Supreme Court case, West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad,141 where the Court
found that telephone lines actually invaded municipal property, amounting
to a compensable taking.14 It is interesting to note that during the time of
this case and St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph, local governments ac-
tively recruited entrepreneurs to connect their towns to telephone sys-
tems.
47
About forty years later, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,'4 the Su-
preme Court found that the government had physically appropriated peti-
tioner's marina by allowing free public access to a channel connecting the
marina to navigable water.' 4 The Court found that the government's at-
tempt to create a public right of access to the marina was a physical inva-
sion. Further, the Court found that this access interfered with Kaiser
Aetna's reasonable, investment-backed expectations, going "so far beyond
ordinary regulation... as to amount to a taking. ,. Further, Kaiser
Aetna referenced the aforementioned San Diego Gas & Electric case, in
which Justice Brennan's dissent definitively stated that just compensation
is required in a regulatory situation: "As soon as private property has been
taken, whether through formal condemnation proceedings, occupancy,
143. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel., 148 U.S. 92 (1893).
144. Id. at 101-02.
145. Western Union Tel. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904).
146. Id.
147. See supra Part II.
148. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 178.
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physical invasion, or regulation, the landowner has already suffered a con-
stitutional violation, and the "'self-executing character of the constitutional
provision with respect to compensation"' is triggered."'
5
'
While these cases set the stage for modem physical takings jurispru-
dence, one of their progeny, the landmark case of Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., best explains how courts should rule when the
constitutionality of section 253 is addressed. In Loretto, a New York state
statute provided that a landlord must permit a cable television company to
install its facilities, in this case small hardware equipment, on and from the
roof of a building located on her property. The statute further directed that
a landlord may not demand payment from the company for installing its
equipment on her property in excess of a one-time fee of one dollar. All of
the New York courts upheld the statute, holding that it served legitimate
police powers and state interests for the purpose of eliminating landlord
fees and other conditions which would prohibit the development of cable
television. However, the United States Supreme Court found that the New
York statute worked a taking of a portion of appellant's property for which
she was entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.'53 The
Court unequivocally stated: "[w]e conclude that a permanent physical oc-
cupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public
interests that it may serve."'
15 4
It is clear that the language of section 253 will trigger the same court
reaction as did the New York statute in Loretto because it authorizes a
permanent physical occupation of that which rightfully belongs to a mu-
nicipality: the area around its rights-of-way. The language of section
253(a), "No State or local statute or regulation... may prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any... telecom-
munications service," ' clearly forbids municipalities from excluding a
telecommunications provider from laying cable under the streets or from
using new or existing poles. Assuming local governments own (in trust)
the rights-of-way in fee, section 253 prohibits local governments from de-
nying access to the streets, which is clearly an appropriation of their right
to exclude others--one of the sticks in their bundle of property rights.
Thus, there exists a permanent physical occupation and a compensable
151. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)
(quoting 6 J. Sackman, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain § 25.41 (rev. 3d ed. 1980))).
152. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 426.
155. Telecommunications Act of 1996, see. 101(a), § 253(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a)
(West Supp. 1997).
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
taking.
In Loretto, the Court found that private property was taken for a pub-
lic use simply by looking at the nature of the cable company's physical in-
vasion. The cable installation on the owner's building was a taking under
the traditional physical test as it involved the attachment of hardware, and
thus, occupied space. Also, property was taken for public use as the entire
community received the benefit of receiving cable television signals.
Similarly, section 253 appropriates municipal property, giving it to tele-
communications concerns with almost no restriction, in the name of
"furthering the telecommunications infrastructure for all" and "eliminating
competition." The public use requirement is satisfied if nonowners will• . . 156
actually use the appropriated property. Some of the beneficiaries of sec-
tion 253 are non-owners, particularly the telecommunications industries.
Therefore, no matter how beneficial such a network might be, the Ameri-
can public must receive just compensation for the value of their appropri-
ated property.
57
While the Supreme Court often upholds even substantial regulation
of an owner's use of his own property where deemed necessary to promote
the public interest,158 section 253 goes significantly beyond the judicially
permissible arena of legislation and subjects municipalities to a physical
intrusion by government. This is, in the words of the Loretto Court, "[an
invasion] of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings
Clause."'59
In Loretto, the Court noted the similarities between Western Union
Telegraph and Loretto. It also noted the significance of post-Western Un-
ion Telegraph cases which:
relying on the character of a physical occupation, clearly establish that
permanent occupations of land by such installations as telegraph and
telephone lines, rails, and underground pipes or wires are takings even
if they occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do
not seriously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his
156. Keith W. Bricklemyer & David Smolker, Inverse Condemnation, in CuRRENT
CONDEMNATION LAW: TAKINGS, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS 54, 56 (Alan T. Ackerman et
al. eds., 1994).
157. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 494 U.S. 24, 31 (1984); United States v. Car-
mack, 329 U.S. 230, 242 (1946) ("[W]hen the Federal Government... takes for a federal
public use the independently held and controlled property of a state or of a local subdivi-
sion, the Federal Government recognizes its obligation to pay just compensation for it and it
is conceded in this case that the Federal Government must pay just compensation for the
land condemned."). Exactly how municipalities should go about valuing the area above,
below, and around their fights-of-way will be discussed infra Part V.C.
158. Loretto,458 U.S. at426.
159. Id.
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land."6
This even more specific description of the circumstances in which there is
a taking directly applies to the situation at hand, where Congress has
"given" telecommunications concerns the right to physically and perma-
nently occupy the property of municipalities. While the amount of space
taken by section 253, as in Loretto, may seem "insubstantial," that fact is
inconsequential. The Loretto Court noted:
[A]n owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly
invades and occupies the owner's property.... [P]roperty law has long
protected an owner's expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed
at least in the possession of his property. To require, as well, that the
owner permit another to exercise complete dominion literally adds in-
sult to injury. 161
While section 253 does not expressly give telecommunications concerns
complete dominion over the entire area beneath a local government's
rights-of-way, it appropriates space that city managers could use, if they
wished, for other purposes. Whether or not they would actually do so or
have other options for use of the rights-of-way is inconsequential. The
New York cable company did not seize Mrs. Loretto's entire apartment
building. There was only a small, but direct physical attachment of plates,
boxes, wires, bolts, and screws occupying space on and above her roof and
along the exterior wall of the building. The Supreme Court, in Loretto,
explained why the size and the magnitude of the permanent physical ap-
propriation should not make a difference to the takings analysis:
The traditional rule also avoids otherwise difficult line-drawing prob-
lems. Few would disagree that if the State required landlords to permit
third parties to install swimming pools on the landlords' rooftops for
the convenience of the tenants, the requirement would be a taking. If
the cable installation here occupied as much space, again, few would
disagree that the occupation would be a taking.... But constitutional
protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend
on the size of the area permanently occupied.
63
Loretto indicates that governmental actions which amount to perma-
nent physical appropriations are particularly serious and actionable of-
fenses. The Supreme Court contended that a permanent physical occupa-
tion is perhaps the most serious form of governmental invasion because it
does not simply take a single stick from the bundle of property rights, but
160. Id. at 430 (citing Lovett v. West Va. Cent. Gas Co., 65 S.E. 196 (W. Va. 1909);
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Webb, 393 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Portsmouth
Harbor Land and Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922)).
161. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
162. Id. at 422.
163. Id. at 436-37.
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"chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand."' 4 Further, the
Loretto Court appreciated the helplessness of a property owner in such
situations, stating: "the permanent physical occupation of property forever
denies the owner any power to control the use of the property; he not only
cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the prop-
erty.' 65 If section 253 is allowed to stand as written, the government ef-
fectively precludes municipalities from using the rights-of-way for another
purpose. As the federal government forces cities to give up a portion of the
limited area beneath their rights-of-way, it necessarily prevents them from
leasing to others space which is rightfully theirs to lease or not to lease at
all.
The Supreme Court is not alone in addressing the takings issue. Con-
stitutional scholars, particularly in the eminent domain arena, have ad-
dressed the subject with zeal. Early in this century, astute legal observers,
basing their comments on opinions culled from the highest courts, estab-
lished that, "[a]ny invasion of property... either upon, above or below the
surface, and whether temporary or permanent, is a taking: as by construct-
ing a ditch through it, passing under it... or extending structures over it,
[such] as a bridge or telephone wire."' ' Further, Professor Frank Michel-
man has commented, "[t]he one incontestable case for compensation (short
of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately
brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, 'regularly' use, or
'permanently' occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood
to be under private ownership."' 67 While it is not clear if Professor
Michelman's reference to "private ownership" would be applied by him in
the instant situation, the taking inherent in Section 253 certainly seems to
comport with the prohibition forwarded in his and other analyses. Thus,
regardless of Supreme Court precedent and other scholarly analysis, Con-
gress has written a piece of legislation allowing telecommunications firms
to permanently occupy the rights-of-way of municipalities, which amounts
to a Fifth Amendment taking requiring just compensation. This Note con-
cludes with a discussion of why "fair" compensation, which was superfi-
cially discussed by Congress, is not the same as the "just" compensation
mandated by the Supreme Court where there is, as here, a taking.
164. Id. at 435 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)).
165. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 430 n.7 (quoting I J. LEwis, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
197 (1988)).
167. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1184 (1967); see also
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1165 (3rd ed. 1988).
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V. FAIR VS. JUST COMPENSATION: How SHOULD
MUNICIPALITIES DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE VALUE To
PLACE ON THEIR RIGHTS-OF-WAY?
With section 253 clearly in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Con-
gress has two options. It can repeal and rewrite section 253 so that munici-
palities and their constituents can determine which and how many carriers
will occupy their rights-of-way and also allow them to charge the fair
rental value for that area. Congress could also, admitting the existence of a
taking, pay local governments just compensation either from the govern-
ment's own coffers, or by extracting fees or taxes from the telecommuni-
cations service provider, the primary beneficiary of the legislation. This
last Part briefly discusses "fair" and "just" compensation and how the two
differ. It then suggests several valuation methods that a city might employ
to determine the value of its own right-of-way infrastructure.
A. "Fair Compensation"
As with the issue of fees,' 68 Congress has not suggested anything de-
finitive or even helpful vis-a-vis the appropriate "fair compensation" fig-
ure for municipalities' rights-of-way. It may be suggested that Congress
purposely does not supply a definition in order to give municipalities that
management control. However, with the FCC adjudicating matters as it did
in Classic, it is clear that a fee structure that does not take into account
each financial factor pertaining to every telecommunications provider
would be taken before the FCC as a barrier to entry, a discriminatory ac-
tion, or a franchise decision not made with competitive neutrality in mind.
Congress provided few clues as to what it thought were appropriate
guidelines for municipal fee structures. Congressman Stupak decried the
amount that cities have been receiving from all utilities on an annual basis
(three percent) yet failed to suggest what figure he thought would be more
fair." 9 Congressman Fields' ruminations, that in many cities, incumbent
telephone companies pay nothing because of century-old contracts which
cities have never tried to "correct," seem to imply that contracts between
large telecommunications carriers and cities are voidable or breachable at
will, a notion which obviously does not comport with traditional contract
theory. Knowing the deep pockets of large telecommunications providers
and the power they wield in congressional circles, it is not surprising that
municipalities have not tried to nullify these long-standing contracts. On
the whole, Congress did not give any indication of what it thought was
168. See supra Part II.D.
169. 141 CONG. REc. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stupak).
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"fair compensation," purporting to leave the matter to municipalities.
However, it is certain that this ambiguous mandate will be among the first
brought to the FCC by disgruntled telecommunications carriers, large and
small, looking to avoid any municipal control of rights-of-way.
While Congress believes that "fair" compensation should be enough
to satisfy municipalities who have some of their most significant property
rights taken away, it is understandable why many municipalities do not see
"fair compensation" as fair at all. While congressmen in legislative debate
repeatedly stated that the terms of the Stupak-Barton amendment were
"supported by cities," they failed to mention that the amendment might
have been supported only because the other option on the floor was an un-
funded mandate allowing cities to charge only a one-time flat fee to tele-
communications providers.' As that mandate threatened to appropriate
over 100 billion dollars from local governments, it is not surprising that
municipalities threw their support behind the Stupak-Barton amendment.
Cities are not satisfied with merely recouping the cost of tending the
rights-of-way, but believe---and rightfully so-that users of municipally-
controlled rights-of-way should also pay "rent" in the form of fees that re-
flect market value. Congress, which is composed largely of lawyers,
should understand that just compensation is the appropriate remedy when
land is taken for public or recreational purposes, such as for a park. Why
should takings under section 253 be any different?
It is clear that advocates of municipality rights, such as Frank Sha-
froth of the National League of Cities, are unhappy with recent congres-
sional forays into the issue of fees and taxes:
For city leaders, the proposal marks not only one of the most severe
threats to federalism-in a year when at least one candidate for the
Presidency claims to carry a copy of the 10th Amendment with him in
his inside coat pocket, and leaders in Congress have talked non-stop
about devolution, turning over greater power and authority to state and
local governments, but also it would result in unprecedented power in
a federal agency [the FCC] that... has been largely non-responsive to
municipal issues and concerns.
Attorney Nicholas Miller, representing municipalities, has stated that
industry representatives and lobbyists will continue to induce states to es-
tablish rules requiring zero compensation for right-of-way usage and to
eliminate local taxes and franchise fees, which could amount to a 20 bil-
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Frank Shafroth, NLC Defends Local Authority in Open Video Systems Challenge,
NATION'S CITIES WKLY., Oct. 14, 1996, at 16.
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lion dollar loss to cities. 73 Without an immediate call for just compensa-
tion to be paid by governments, or for fair rental value to be paid by tele-
communications concerns, this lobbying perhaps could take the appropria-
tion mentality behind section 253 to these aforementioned extremes. Cities
contend they are not "gold-digging," but are simply seeking compensation
for experiencing property damage, enduring the constant harassment of
telecommunications firms, and losing control over their rights-of-way.
Cities also state that they want to value the area beneath their rights-of-
way in terms of "just compensation" which, considering the language of
the Fifth Amendment, is a reasonable request. 74
B. "Just Compensation"
While the concept of "just compensation" has been analyzed more
than that of "fair compensation" (the latter of which is particular to section
253), courts and commentators still have not come to a consensus about
what it comprises in many circumstances. Unfortunately, the most peculiar
of these valuation situations usually occurs in the context of valuing rights-
of-way. There are, however, judicial decisions and economic opinions that
provide a starting point for analysis.
In United States v. 563.54 Acres ofLand, the Court stated that market
value is generally a useful and generally sufficient tool for ascertaining the
compensation required to make the owner whole." 175 Further, in United
States v. 50 Acres of Land, Justice Stevens stated that the Fifth Amend-
ment requires the United States government to pay "just compensation,"
which is normally measured by fair market value, whenever it takes pri-
vate property for public use. 76 This concept is exemplified by a phrase the
Court used in describing just compensation in terms of fair market value
forty years hence in United States v. Miller: "what a willing buyer would
pay in cash to a willing seller.,
177
The Supreme Court also has stated that just compensation could be
measured by calculating "the market value of the property at the time of
the taking contemporaneously paid in money.' 78 These methods of valuing
rights-of-way suggest that fair market value is the determinative factor in
placing a number on just compensation. It is obvious from the competitive
173. Local Govis. Prepare Fight for Authority at State Level, WARREN'S CABLE REG.
MONrroR, Sept. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10832573.
174. Gruley, supra note 98.
175. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
176. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 26 (1984).
177. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
178. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246,255 (1934).
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neutrality and nondiscrimination mandates in section 253 that municipali-
ties will not be allowed, without FCC or court interference, to use fair
market value in pricing their rights-of-way. With section 253 in place, the
compensatory scheme that will arise out of the telecommunications com-
panies' complaints will undoubtedly be a windfall to the telephone and ca-
ble industries and a loss to municipalities.
Some local governments have already begun taking action in revalu-
ing their rights-of-way. Orange and Seminole Counties in Florida have be-
gun writing ordinances allowing their municipalities to exact fees more
approximate of fair market value. Those particular counties are looking at
fees based on the number of linear feet of public property each company
uses, 79 a practice that is becoming standard for most municipalities. If ap-
propriately priced, market-based methods will be fairer to municipalities in
collecting a fair rental value for their rights-of-way. The next section de-
tails ways in which municipalities might calculate this amount.
C. Methods Municipalities Should Consider for
Right-of-Way Valuation
It is difficult to value the area comprising the rights-of-way because
it is seldom, if ever, traded on any sort of market. However, local govern-
ments have begun an attempt to place a dollar value on the area beneath
their rights-of-way. Municipalities should take the initiative and begin us-
ing cost accounting principles to allocate their right-of-way management
costs to telecommunications concerns. Using rudimentary cost accounting
methodology, cities should put precise direct costs (e.g., a certain utility
cut on a certain day) into a different "bucket" for each firm. Indirect costs
should then be apportioned in a similar manner. For instance, if a sidewalk
buckles, the firms who had been digging in the area during the relevant pe-
riod will be assessed a pro rata portion of the repair cost. Cities will be
forced to think about the differences between telecommunications provid-
ers and others who use the area beneath the rights-of-way (e.g., water and
gas providers) to determine whether they want to begin charging all users
of the rights-of-way on a pro rata basis.
The methods of right-of-way valuation are varied and the one a mu-
nicipality will use will depend on the sophistication and number of mu-
nicipal managers, their computer and spreadsheet capabilities, the number
of right-of-way occupants in a city, the relevant population base, and the
location of the local government in the national telecommunications infra-
structure.
179. Stutzman, supra note 91, at 9.
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1. Fair Market or Rental Value
One method for municipalities to consider in valuing their rights-of-
way is simply to add up the direct and indirect maintenance costs to mu-
nicipalities and the nuisances imparted on the citizens (e.g., noise and traf-
fic problems). This is similar to the aforementioned "bucket" method used
in cost accounting. To calculate direct costs, municipalities should aggre-
gate all of their right-of-way management costs and assess them on the
various utilities on a pro rata basis. For instance, if a city could determine
that it spent fifty percent of its management dollars resurfacing roads as a
direct result of repeated utility digs, it could discern which utilities and
telecommunications service providers cut into certain rights-of-way, how
profoundly it did so, and how many times it did so, assessing that fifty per-
cent on a pro rata basis among the relevant players.
It has been suggested that the best way to calculate indirect costs of
use of the rights-of-way (such as accidents, an increase in vehicle operat-
ing costs, and psychological costs) is to rate areas being used according to
the potential for societal impact caused by increased utility digs."' Al-
though somewhat subjective, the rating would directly impact how utility
projects would be assigned fees and would build into that fee structure in-
centives for telecommunications firms to use methods with the lowest total
societal costs.''
The fair rental value method assumes a hypothetical lease arrange-
ment between the telecommunications provider and the local government,
which would use the difficult-to-discern "fair market value" of the space
occupied, or the opportunity cost of not having the space available for its
own use. Rental value figures would be based on assumed future uses and
value."' The calculations could be based upon the property value at its ac-
tual level of use prior to the taking, the value at the most restrictive level
of use (the constitutionally-permissible floor), or the value at all available
uses (the highest and best use). 83 The latter value is the one preferred by
eminent domain theorists and jurists.' 4
180. RAYMOND L. STERLING, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STUDY OF
THE INDIRECT COSTS OF UTMrY PLACEMENT AND REPAIR BENEATH STREETs (Aug. 1994) (on
file with author).
181. Id.
182. See J. Margaret Tretbar, Comment, Calculating Compensation for Temporary
Regulatory Takings, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 201 (1993).




The value of a right-of-way can be determined by the lost opportunity
of having it available. However, using that valuation method forces an as-
sumption that there are other utilities or services that would otherwise use
the right-of-way. These hypothetical utilities and services would either be
those whose revenue completely accrued to the municipality, or those
which would be willing to pay a given value to which the telecommunica-
tions provider's payment could be compared. This probably would be a
difficult valuation method in many American towns and cities as there is
often only one water company, one gas company, and one electric com-
pany. That simple fact would drive down the value of having the right-of-
way available because there would be few opportunities inherent in such a
situation. The space that would have been taken up by the telecommunica-
tions carrier would simply stand idle.'85 Thus, local governments might
want to value their rights-of-way based on the highest or marginal amount
a telecommunications provider would pay before laying their cable else-
where.'86 Thus, fair market value could be viewed as the opportunity cost
to a telecommunications concern for using municipal rights-of-way instead
of those belonging to a railroad or other private entity.
3. Option Value'87
Some courts "have determined that compensation for a temporary
regulatory taking is the value of an option to purchase the property for the
period of time during which the regulation was in effect."' However, as
discussed earlier, with section 253, the time period is eternal because it is a
permanent physical appropriation. Thus, option value might be treated like
a perpetuity and capitalized at the market rate of return. By treating prop-
erty as having option characteristics, municipalities can calculate the hy-
pothetical value of keeping vacant the space appropriated by telecommuni-
cations companies, much like the opportunity cost situation. Municipalities
185. This theory does not take into consideration the enormous cost to the community of
not having the telecommunications provider's cable beneath the street at all. In that case the
municipality's residents would have to rely on wireless services, the cost of which would
probably be significantly more (and the feasibility of which would have been zero several
years ago).
186. Again, this proposition is theoretical as without wireless services, telecommunica-
tions carriers would have to resort to using another right-of-way infrastructure, such as that
belonging to the railroads. Where that was not feasible (such as in downtown areas) service
providers would have to string cable from building to building, paying each individual
owner the "fair market value" for using her property.
187. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORIORATE FINANCE 571 (1996); Tretbar, supra note
182, at 226.
188. Tretbar, supra note 182, at 226.
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would be asked, in theory, to "bet," as do options traders on an exchange,
on what the chances are that a better rental opportunity would exist but for
the presence of the telecommunications service providers in the rights-of-
way. Unfortunately, the esoteric nature of the right-of-way option situa-
tion, for which there is no formalized market or exchange (yet), would
make it unattractive for municipalities both in terms of calculation and
governmental approval.
VI. THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE
As matters currently stand, and with many questions about section
253 and the 1996 Act long from being settled, most cities should supple-
ment existing telecommunications ordinances with amendments covering
situations barred by section 253. These ordinances would be best if kept
simple, perhaps specifying the minimum financial and physical require-
ments necessary for a firm to use the city streets. In this way, municipali-
ties would avoid snaring themselves in the section 253(a) or (b) traps that
captured Hill City and Bogue, Kansas, in the Classic decision. Currently,
some states are fighting back, angry about how cities and towns are losing
their local management powers and are being mistreated by Congress and
telecommunications providers.' Municipalities and states must continue
to band together to fight the preemption petitions filed with the FCC and
the complaints filed in United States District Court. Through commend-
able federal court action like that in GST Tucson Lightwave, perhaps local
governments can enable Congress to see section 253 for what it really is: a
permanent physical appropriation which must be compensated. With the
unprecedented building of telecommunications infrastructures, communi-
ties will continue to fight the federal government and telecommunications
companies over the extent of their management powers pursuant to section
253. As one attorney has noted: "'We are looking at perhaps the largest
public works project ever over the next 20 years. The cities can't simply
step aside." ' 190
189. Gruley, supra note 98.
190. Id. (quoting attorney Nicholas Miller).

